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Abstract: The trend in France in the chemical industry following the Toulouse
accident in 2001 has created a situation where some of the installations have got
closer to the definition of  high reliable or resilient systems. This papers based on an
empirical case study elaborates on the question: can we see better with the help of an
articulation of safety engineering, safety management and social concepts (extracted
from the safety and accident field) some dimensions, for example the level of
resilience (or reliability), that are not captured today with traditional tools? Our
approach articulates two investigative modes to capture an organisational safety
dynamic: a normal study approach (what's happening when nothing is happening?)
with an incidental-accidental one (looking at past incidents or accidents and their
organisational genesis) in order to generate assumptions regarding the presence of
organisational patterns influencing safety.
1. INTRODUCTION
The trend in France in the chemical industry following the Toulouse accident in
2001 has created a situation where some of the installations have got closer to the
definition of  high reliable or resilient organisations1. They are indeed under
pressure from the society for being very safe while also being under pressure from
the market for producing in the most efficient ways, for maximising profits.
Economic pressure is one of the strong trait of our capitalistic societies and a
resulting effect of a global world market. Companies must be managed under
strong financial and competitive pressures. Constraints also come now from the
expectations and sensitivity from society regarding safety. These expectations
push companies to communicate more on safety. They for example as a result
sometimes open their doors for the public in order for it to visit the plants, with a
goal of transparency and societal trust. The societal needs following the Toulouse
disaster also led authorities, as a political measure, to increase the number of
inspections by recruiting more inspectors and the relevance of the inspections, by
training inspectors specifically to major hazard prevention.
Some of these chemical plants have high safety performances, with only minor
incidents over a 20-30 years period. Some could have therefore been considered
                                                
1 By choosing “organisation”, we target the actors employed by the company and working in the
plant. The “socio-technical system” expression can be used to open the organisation to other actors
such as the regulators, the sub-contractors, the corporate, the public. When we use “organisation”
in this paper, we mean the organisation within its socio-technical system. In an approach
acknowledging the complexity of safety and accidents dynamic, such a perspective is unavoidable.
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as equivalent to high reliable organisations even before the Toulouse accident. As
a result in terms of prevention, one of the difficulty becomes therefore in these
type of systems to capture the potential drifts and deviancies, as shown by
accidents investigations and works from scholars, in particular when they have
implemented all safety management best practices existing in the industry.
The field of resilience addresses this issue, and a fruitful way of turning it is also
to follow Snook (2000) with saying that the insidious accidents threatening these
organisations are Normal Accident in High Reliable Organisations, so that one of
the purpose of these organisations is to maintain a sense of vulnerability and an
ability to be introspective enough to anticipate the "slippery slopes" (Vaughan,
2005), to be able to "dance" with the Brownian movement (Rasmussen, 1997) and
to prevent a Resonance phenomena (Hollnagel, 2004) within their installations.
This perspective implies therefore not to focus solely on the technological
complexity but as Snook indicated in regards with his work on what we call the
organisational safety and accident dynamic: "While Perrow's emphasis was on
complex technologies and demonstrating the inevitability of such accidents , mine
is on uncovering their underlying behavioral and organisational dynamics (...)”.
One of the question can thus be: how to provide useful auditing tools linking
safety engineering, safety management practices and social concepts of
organisations (Le-Coze, 2005) to help identifying these potential slippery slopes?
It raises the question that everyone is asking following an accident, why couldn't
we see before what seems quite clear after, with hindsight? How to design the
tools to see what is obvious only after, when we know that the accidents dynamics
lies in the complexities of the interactions between the technical, human and
organisational dimensions?
Our current research project has three purposes and questions  in that respect:
1. Can we see better with the help of an articulation of safety engineering,
safety management and social concepts (extracted from the safety and accident
field) some dimensions that are not captured today with traditional tools, the
level of resilience (or reliability) of a chemical site?
2. Is what we see helpful for practitioners so that they can use it as a support
for creating or sustaining safety in a better way that they did before, without
us?
3. Can we transfer these tools to "non experts" for internal auditing purposes
performed for example by safety people and safety auditors?
This paper elaborates on the first question. It is based on an empirical case study
for which we attempted to connect safety engineering with safety management
and social concepts. This paper is meant to be part of a reflexive step in our
research process rather than a definitive conclusion to the question. The content of
the paper is also very restricted, it is a rather general view that is presented here,
without the details.
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In a first part, we introduce the plant where we carried out the research. In a
second part we discuss the strategy we followed to try to describe and interpret
what  we call the organisational safety dynamic and we conclude.
2. THE PLANT
The plant described here is an entity of a chemical company located in the USA
and owner of 100 subsidiaries all over the world. The company is organised under
a matrix principle. It means that certain activities are centralised either in the
headquarters or in companies having specific resources for dealing with specific
questions (such as salary payment), a particular production and consequently
working for other plants. Through different restructurations of the production
lines in the world, the plant has a leader role in its production segment, but a
margin position when we consider the global production set of the whole
company. It has around 350 employees, develops its production volume and have
therefore to hire people while the other companies in the neighbourhood have
been firing employees regularly during the last decade. The “safety culture” as
they formulate it, is a great challenge for the company which tries to enhance the
safety performance of the whole company through different actions and is used to
communicate broadly on this topic. It has to be added that the safety manager in
this French plant is responsible for safety not only in France, but in Europe, and
belongs to the network of safety managers aiming to maintain the plants on a high
safety level.
As mentioned, the plant can be described as a HRO (Roberts, 1990): it has namely
a very safe production history with no accident registered in the last 22 years, the
safety perception of the employees is reinforced over different tools and systems,
last but not least it has very good relations to the regulators because it fits with the
objectives given to the industry. The social organisation is also designed for
having good work conditions, for example six shifts of five people have been
introduced after the working time reduction for targeting a full team work all over
the year. Nevertheless the production pressure has increased in the last years.
3. DESCRIBING AND INTERPRETING AN ORGANISATIONAL
SAFETY DYNAMIC
Our research strategy is based on two strong principles:
1. Articulating the organisational safety dynamic on the safety barriers (technical
and human) of the installations. This has now a long history, from Haddon (1973)
through Johnson (1973) to more recent works like, Hollnagel (2004) or Hale et al.
(2005), Hale et al. (2006). The approach retained here is to be anchored enough in
the preventive design of the system against major hazard scenarios at a micro
level (technical and individual and collective) in order to link this design with
higher features of the system, like meso level (organisation) and macro level
(environment of the organisation). The idea is to try to put the organisation in
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motion. Organisations are indeed characterised by constant evolutions and
stability seems rather to be the exception in these systems, than the norm.
2. Articulating two investigative modes to reveal an organisational safety
dynamic: a normal study approach (what's happening when nothing is
happening?) with an accidental one (looking at past incidents or accident and the
organisational sides of the genesis of accident) in order to generate assumptions
regarding the relevant patterns influencing safety.
3.1 Connecting with the barriers
The initial step consisted in applying the first principle introduced above and
therefore in understanding the hazards and related technical and human barriers
designed and implemented for controlling risks. Through this step, we identified
several scenarios and finally focused on two main activities of the plant.  The
choice was to limit the areas to be investigated as the time available for the project
would have not allowed us to look at all the activities of the plant. However by
choosing a highly automated and core process of the plant with one of the most
hazardous scenario, we thought that we could get quite in depth in the way the
organisational safety dynamic influenced these activities.
The safety barriers are a combination of technical (hardware and software) and
human tasks to be performed in order for the installation to stay within the safety
limits as defined during design and risk analysis. Due to the interactions between
technology and humans, some of the safety barriers are a mix of tasks to be
performed as a co-ordination between technology and people (as for example an
operator reacting on an alarm and consequently manually closing a valve).  In this
case it is possible to discriminate them by indicating the specific role that they
play by decomposing each of the tasks required for the safety functions to be
met2. These tasks can be described in terms of sequences consisting in
identification-diagnosis-action to be performed for reaching some defined goals.
Both human and software can be described through such sequences.  However
some technical devices are passive hardware so that they do not integrate
software, or even external source of energy, as for example a rupture disk or a
dyke. Sometimes, some human tasks do not include the use of safety devices at all
(such as an operator checking a quantity of product to be put in a vessel, before
putting it, or an operator escaping during an emergency).
                                                
2 There is probably not a single and best way of distinguishing barriers, but this simple
decomposition proved heuristically valid and simple enough to be used for the purpose of our
research and developments.
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When the barriers are identified, they can be assessed in terms of their adequacies
for preventing the events that they are supposed to prevent. Features such as the
response time, the independence, the redundancy, the capacity to fulfil the
function, the level of confidence, are to be considered.  Of course technical and
human tasks can't be assessed the same way (human cognition and human
interactions models are for example not as accurate as those in use for man-made
software and hardware), but this issue is not developed in this paper. One of the
outcome of this first step can be for example a graphic representation showing in a
simple way the safety barriers designed for preventing the hazardous scenario. In
the case retained for this paper, the scenario identified concerns the loss of
containment of toxic chemical products following an increase of pressure and
leading to a rupture of the vessel (figure 1).
A set of 8 barriers have been identified. The possibility of an operator loading too
much or loading incompatible product to the reaction is one first event. This is
prevented by operators checking what they are supposed to put (this is carried out
by two people from two different teams) but also by a software function based on
value comparison of masses and expected pumping time. The heat excess and loss
of agitator is backed up by first a software action linked with heat excess and an
alarm in case of electric loss or agitator failure. The next barrier is the presence of
a quench in case of a runaway reaction. This hardware is meant to pour water in
the reaction for stopping a runaway reaction, and can be manually activated but is
also programmed to be activated on high pressure threshold. The sixth one is a












leading to lack of heat
transfer during reaction





















2. Software lock based on
values comparison
figure 1: Barriers for loss of containment of toxic substances
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the vessel from reaching a rupture threshold and blowing. The seventh one is a
catch tank collecting what is released through the relief system. The last one is a
vent scrubber designed for treating atmospheric emissions in case of high pressure
in the catch tank requiring release of product outside.
This simplified description is meant, when we move away from the scenarios
themselves to the human and social world, to guide, to focus interviews and
observations, with in mind what is there to be prevented by the organisation.
3.2 A normal, non incidental-accidental study perspective
The next step consisted in putting the organisation in motion in a non incidental-
accidental perspective. To get into this normal perspective, we implemented two
techniques:
1. Describing and assessing the safety management system in place, and compare
it to existing good practices in the field, in a more traditional auditing approach.
This consists in checking the presence and articulation of safety related activities,
from risk analysis to learning from experience through training or maintenance.
The specificity was to anchor questions in relation with the barriers identified.
2. Interviewing people (operators, managers, executives) in an open perspective,
without being guided by an underlying safety management system model, but
instead having opened discussions about subjects related to safety, but also to
subjects that would be relevant but not always directly related to safety (such as
working conditions, team relationships, evolutions, trends in management,
technologies, market etc), in a more sociological approach. The underlying and
guiding models are those from the human and social sciences in general, and the
ones specifically developed in the safety field. In regards with what we know
from accidents (drift, deviancies and their underlying favourable conditions), it
was for example, found relevant to describe the evolutions of the organisation,
and interview people about the impacts of these on their work in regards with
safety, about the impacts on their interaction with their working colleagues.
The two techniques are complementary. It seems especially relevant when the
company has a good approach of safety management and a long tradition of
implementing safety management principles3. The second approach in that case
helps in identifying interesting factors.
Thus, we identified important trends such as the new market and competition of
China but also the changes in technology with more and more automation towards
an harmonisation throughout the plant and processes. We also found useful to
notice other changes located at corporate levels affecting the organisation, so that
managers don't have much power anymore but only manage money and do not
have strong strategic autonomy. The plant has become a profit center.
Production pressure got also more and more intense and they for example as a
consequence look for alternative way of producing during holidays. This would
                                                
3 This comment is quite compatible with idea of the need for different safety-accident models
according to the type of system investigated, from safe to ultra safe systems.
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help limiting the duration of plant stops. This has consequences for maintenance
planning, as maintenance teams have always had so far a traditional break
throughout the summer for taking the time to perform their activities. Some
internal organisational changes have also recently affected the safety meetings so
that people from different units do not meet in the same way that they used to
anymore.
In fact, it can be revealed a situation of the plant under similar constraints of a
policy of  Better / Cheaper /Faster, coping with at least three sometimes
antagonistic goals: safety & environment, production, quality. Some plays around
the safety rules (such as “necessary violations”, Reason, 1993 or adaptations such
as the ETTO concept, Hollnagel, 2004) thanks to tacit agreements from the
hierarchy do happen. Without them, the organisation would probably not run
smoothly under such constraints (we have heard it, and we have seen it). Of
course this picture of an organisation which gives signs of playing with its limits
(Starbuck et al, 2005) can't be applied strictly to this plant as downsizing, budget
restrictions or loss of expertise with departure of experienced and skilled workers
is not the case at all here. It must be on the contrary balanced with good signs of
resilience or reliability. For example, the expertise on safety issues by the safety
department is high and time is taken for performing risk analysis, management of
change but also training and learning from experience. The management of the
plant has a strong experience of the chemical industry and a background of
chemical engineering helping him to better conceptualise the technical safety
issues. The expertise available in safety engineering throughout the group is also
very high and helpful when used.
The next part introduces the incidental-accidental approach, that we used for
discussing the findings of the non incidental-accidental, normal, perspective as
described above. In theory, this technique is easier because it consists in
describing and interpreting events by unfolding  the context of these ones.
3.3 Incidental & accidental study perspective
The other strong advantages is that it shows the organisation as it really is because
the incidental-accidental study reveals the true side – or the "dark side" (Sagan,
1993, Vaughan, 1999) – of the organisation. The interest in looking at the
incidental-accidental perspective is to have the opportunity to describe the impact
of a specific organisational design on safety. It is indeed very difficult to describe
the impact of the regular evolutions and transformations of the organisational
design without the help of concrete safety related events. The absence of events is
also indeed in principle a strong indication that the level of safety is good, but it
might also be interpreted that relevant information are not captured and analysed.
In our case study, two incidents were easily identified, and couldn't have gone
unnoticed. Two runaway reactions, in the processes that we chose to study for the
research, ended up in the catch tank few months ago. These two incidents were
very similar, revealing a weakness in the installation design but also therefore in
the way the organisation was able to identify and assess risks. However, a positive
side of the event was that it also made clear that the back up design of the
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installations was well dimensioned for the scenario, because toxic gases were
contained and only a small quantity of gas treated through the scrubber was
released to the atmosphere. The incident didn't trigger any concern from the
nearby towns and inhabitants.
After studying the analysis performed by the company on these events, the
approach that we followed consisted in interviewing the operators involved during
the incidents, in order to hear directly the chronology but also how they perceived
the events, and the way it was treated internally. We then interviewed the people
who participated to the analysis, so that we could understand better how  it
impacted their representation regarding the level of safety of the plants but also
how the organisation did learn from it.
The main technical cause is linked with the agitator stopping in both cases (one
for a power cut and the other for a failure of a software component) and then
creating a direct path to an uncontrollable runaway reaction leading to the rupture
disk to blow and then to release the content of the vessel in the catch tank. This
accident sequence is quite clear when using figure 1. It is interesting to notice that
the quench that was supposed to stop the runaway reaction couldn't serve this
purpose when the agitator was stopped, so that in this specific scenario, it is in
general inadequate.
Without going too much in the detail of this case and its analysis, it is interesting
here to notice that a scenario found its way throughout to create an uncontrolled
runaway reaction4. Without questioning the outcomes of these events which
definitely also proved twice the safe design of the  installations, it is however an
opportunity for the organisation to learn about the inability of a network of people
to anticipate and to prevent the incident. Looking the events this way, some clear
organisational dynamic dimensions appeared. They demonstrate how an
organisation can sometimes generate its own blind spots, but also how the ability
to stay updated in regards with available methods and safety technology, although
available internally within the group, was not generated to identify and assess the
scenario, and investing for example in a new design. Availability of time but also
of resources in safety can be pointed at, all these factors diminishing the
possibility of a requisite imagination (Adamski, Westrum, 2003). Without the
expected behaviour of the barriers as designed (a proportionate design of the relief
system, maintenance of catch tank), the events could have ended up in a more
important incidents.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to introduce current findings and some discussions
around the assessment of the resilience or reliability of an organisation by a team
of outsiders in the chemical industry based in a case study. The paper stressed the
importance for such an assessment of connecting a normal study approach (whats
happening when nothing is happening?) with an accidental one (looking at past
                                                
4 We get close here to the Perrow’s (1984)  normal accident idea, of unplanned and hidden
interactions within the installations.
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accident and the organisational sides of the genesis of accident). This helps in
contrasting interpretations and also articulating them.
Regarding the question "what's happening when nothing is happening?", it is clear
to us that, in a capitalistic society, a company looks for technological and
organisational transformations that help creating more profits, while maintaining a
reasonable perceived level of safety. There is nothing to be surprised of. Changes
will affect the system probably until it is proved that the system becomes not safe
anymore. The conditions of this dynamical process depends on the interaction of
cognitive, psychological, social, cultural, economical and political dimensions,
making of prevention a complex phenomena.
The first results of our case study indicate that the company, despite an excellent
approach of safety, got surprised by a preventable scenario, demonstrating that
even in organisation dedicating resources to reach the features of high reliable
systems, the possibility for blind spots to develop is far from being unlikely. The
trend affecting the current transformation of the organisation should be considered
very carefully in regards with these recent events. Availability of time for key
safety people to step back and look at the installations in light of the new available
safety technologies, of the new available risk analysis methods and of the
incidents from similar installations, should be ensured.
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